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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY AREN’T DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRATS AND
ELECTION LAWYERS TALKING?
In recent years, political philosophy has been largely dominated by
theories of deliberative democracy, such as those offered by Jurgen
Habermas in his monumental Between Facts and Norms 1 and Amy
Gutmann and Dennis Thompson in their lucid Democracy and
Disagreement. 2 The key concept for deliberative democrats is
conversation: the exercise of political power, according to deliberative
democrats, is only legitimate when it is justified by conversation and
(ideally) agreement with other citizens, based on reasons that they can all
understand. 3 In developing this ideal of conversation, deliberative
democrats have pointedly opposed theories of democracy that see the
exercise of power (perhaps cynically) as simply a matter of bargaining and
balancing interests, rather than a rule of deliberative reason. 4 However, this
has made it imperative that deliberative democrats show how their theories
work in practice. Otherwise, they risk opening themselves up to the charge
that, although their theories may sound nice, in practice politics really is
just about power and interests. If the interest theory of democracy aimed
low, at least it gave a plausible description of how democratic politics
worked and could work. As a result of challenges to its practicality,
deliberative democratic theory, in the words of one prominent deliberative
♦ M.A., PhD., The University of Chicago (2004); J.D., Yale Law School (2007). The author
thanks Pam Karlan, Michael Neblo, and Danny Priel for conversations on earlier drafts.
1
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996) (1992).
2
AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996). See also
DELIBERATIVE POLITICS: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (Stephen Macedo ed., 1999).
Other important collections on deliberative democracy are DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: ESSAYS ON
REASON AND POLITICS (James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon
Elster ed., 1998); and DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds.,
2003).
3
Versions of this idea can be found in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) and Joshua
Cohen & Charles Sable, Directly-Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997).
4
For classics in this area, see THEODORE LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); JOSEPH
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942); and more recently RICHARD
POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003).
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democrat, “has moved beyond the ‘theoretical statement’ stage and into the
‘working theory’ stage.” 5
Around the same time as the rise of deliberative democracy in political
theory, the study of law witnessed an increasing interest in the practice of
elections. Although Bush v. Gore 6 in some ways now represents the key
moment in the rise of election law as “its own field of study,” 7 legal
theorists had already remarked on the gradual “constitutionalization of
democratic politics.” 8 According to a path-breaking Harvard Law Review
Foreword by Richard Pildes, the Supreme Court has been making
decisions about elections that assume, even if they do not explicitly
articulate, a theory about democratic structure: how elections should be
run, who should be able to vote, etc. 9 In many cases over the past few
years, Pildes says, the Supreme Court has been slowly developing a theory
of democracy that emphasizes order and stability over robust
competition. 10 And as further evidence of the Supreme Court’s lurch into
political theories of democracy, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor needed to
rely on the work of Hannah Pitkin in order to distinguish between two
types of representation in an opinion involving the representation of
African-Americans in Georgia. 11 The Court’s recent and increasing
intervention into the law of elections shows, according to election scholars,
that the Court is slowly involved in hammering out a “law of
democracy.” 12
Given the evident and even patent relationship of these two fields—
political theory and election law—and the trend of one (political theory)
towards the more practical and the trend of the other (election law) towards
theory, one would expect there to be a burgeoning and fruitful exchange
between the two disciplines. Deliberate democrats would need to be aware
5

Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 307, 307 (2003).
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000).
Questions about legitimacy of election law as an important area of study were largely pre-Bush v.
Gore. See generally Symposium, Election Law as Its Own Field of Study, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1095
(1999); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY (2002).
8
Richard H. Pildes, Foreword: The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 28 (2004).
9
Id. See also Richard Pildes, Constitutionalizing Democratic Politics, in A BADLY FLAWED
ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 155 (Ronald
Dworkin ed., 2002) (noting the implicit theoretical ambitions of the Supreme Court in election law,
with special reference to Bush v. Gore).
10
Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME
COURT 140 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).
11
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 481, 483 (2003) (citing HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967)).
12
For the foundational casebook in the area, see ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 7.
6
7
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of the constraints on democratic decisionmaking imposed by Supreme
Court decisions (and election law more generally) in order to make sure
their proposals are feasible and sensitive to real-world conditions. And
election law theorists would need to have a grounding in political theory in
order to make theoretical sense of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, and
to offer intelligent critiques of it. In short, one would have expected a
convergence on what Dennis Thompson has recently called “midrange
principles,” that is, neither broad principles (on the level of deliberative
democracy) nor simply case-by-case analysis (as in election law) but
reflection on “principles of electoral justice and . . . their relation to
electoral institutions.” 13
Unfortunately, very little of this has taken place. Even in the book
quoted above, Dennis Thompson does little to connect his larger theory of
deliberative democracy to his proposed institutional changes, and his book
reads more like a primer on election law for philosophers. 14 Although
Thompson does a good job of identifying the divide in the current literature
between theory and practice, his book does not succeed in bridging that
divide.
My essay tries to show the ways in which deliberative democrats and
election law theorists need each other. I do so by examining in detail one
proposed reform of American democracy along deliberative lines, offered
by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin in their book Deliberation Day. 15
The focus here is partial but not, I think, unwarranted. Ackerman and
Fishkin’s book represents a bold and rigorously formulated effort to make
voting more reflective and citizens more engaged in voting. However, in
the course of their proposals, Ackerman and Fishkin miss how key
elements of the structure of American election law threaten to make
“Deliberation Day” into less of an arena for wide-ranging democratic
deliberation than it could be and to introduce deliberation into areas where
we might prefer that it not be.
In one respect, my criticism of Ackerman and Fishkin is similar to a
criticism made about democratic theory in the abstract: it is said that
deliberative democracy, although it purports to be inclusive, actually

13

DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS viii, ix (2002).
Id.
15
BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004) [hereinafter Ackerman &
Fiskin, DELIBERATION DAY]. Earlier work by the two authors laid the groundwork for their
collaboration. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980) [hereinafter
Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE]; 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); JAMES S.
FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION (1991).
14
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excludes some viewpoints, and artificially restricts dialogue. 16 For
example, Bruce Ackerman’s earlier book, which emphasized dialogue as a
way of justifying political principles, 17 was criticized for artificially
excluding “some certain conceptions of the good life” by “privatiz[ing]
them and push[ing] them out of . . . public debate in the liberal state.” 18 I
do not claim that Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal purposefully excludes
some voices, only that by relying on certain features of American electoral
structure, they miss the ways in which deliberation might be biased,
unproductive, or incomplete. The point is, no deliberation takes place in a
vacuum, and it pays to be aware of the structures that will inevitably
dictate the direction and even sometimes the outcomes of deliberation. In
the case of deliberative democracy, that structure, at least in the American
context, is provided by election law, and (at the limit) the Constitution.
In what follows, I look at three areas of election law that Ackerman and
Fishkin fail to appreciate. These areas are: the law regarding political
parties, political gerrymanders, and racial districting. In the first two areas,
the dilemma is that protection for existing political parties could skew
deliberation towards the extremes of left and right, and work to exclude
voices that might diverge from the lines of the two major parties.
Interestingly, Ackerman and Fishkin not only do not challenge the twoparty system, they embrace it, using the major political parties as key
functionaries in the management of Deliberation Day. In the third area
(racial districting), the problem is more subtle. It involves the question of
whether deliberation of the kind favored in Deliberation Day is in tension
with deliberation at the level of Congress. Sometimes, in the pursuit of
better deliberation at a different level, we might prefer that there be less
citizen-level deliberation rather than more. For example, we might want to
guarantee some “safe” minority congressional seats, which may contribute
to better deliberation at the congressional level because of the presence of
more diverse voices.
Ackerman and Fishkin’s relative neglect of these important areas of
election law points to a larger theme of this paper, which is that sometimes
there will be inevitable trade-offs between the kinds of deliberation we
want. Do we want better deliberation at the citizen level, or at the
representative level? We may have to choose. We also might have to
choose between deep debate between two parties, and a more wide-ranging
16

See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
Ackerman, SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 15.
18
SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF 97 (1992). See generally MONIQUE DEVEAUX,
CULTURAL PLURALISM AND DILEMMAS OF JUSTICE (2000).
17
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debate among multiple parties in a presidential election. And again, there
may be a choice we have to make between inadequate deliberation now
and better deliberation later. Should we choose in favor of immediate yet
inadequate deliberation, or do we wait for more structural reforms to be
made? I argue that there are trade-offs that election law forces us to make
and that it pays to be aware of those trade-offs. Ackerman and Fishkin
implicitly make certain choices in their proposal for one electoral regime
over the other without justifying their choices. 19 But greater attention to the
current structure of American election law can make us aware of the costs
and benefits of choosing one deliberative regime over another. It can also
show us that in each of these three cases, the implicit choices of Ackerman
and Fishkin will result in worse deliberation rather than better deliberation.
Finally, my paper tries to show that attention to the structure of
American election law teaches us that sometimes the best means to get to
the ideal of deliberation is not more deliberation. Ackerman and Fishkin
work from the bottom up. 20 They believe that if citizens are more
deliberative, then the President and Congress and politics more generally
will be more deliberative—that “[i]f Deliberation Day succeed[s],
everything else would change.” 21 Better deliberation among citizens
would have effects across the entire political structure, from the quality of
candidates to the influence of money, and even to the structure of political
parties. 22 My suggestion is that top-down reforms are also necessary, and
in some cases need to take priority over deliberative ends if we want to
achieve some of the goals Ackerman and Fishkin (and I) hope to reach.
II. PARTIES
I propose to consider the relationship between theories of deliberative
democracy by looking closely at one particular proposal: the idea for
Deliberation Day defended and articulated by Bruce Ackerman and James
Fishkin. Why this one? Certainly there are other proposals, such as Ethan
Leib’s suggestion of a fourth branch of government. 23 Two reasons
counsel in favor of choosing Ackerman and Fishkin (apart from the fact
that it seems to be the proposal most fully developed and imagined). First,
19

See detailed discussion infra Part II.
This is especially evident in the first few pages of their book. See Ackerman & Fishkin,
DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 3.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
ETHAN LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2004).
20
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Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal is bold and comprehensive, affecting at
the limit both presidential and congressional elections. Its sweep and its
radicalness allow us to see the potential defects of institutionalizing
deliberative democracy in especially bright relief: the problems with
deliberative democracy and election law will show up here, whereas they
might not be as obvious in smaller scale, incremental reforms. At the same
time, Ackerman and Fishkin’s Deliberation Day experiment seems
realistic—they themselves characterize it as an exercise in “realistic
utopianism.” 24 Not only do they take seriously questions of cost and
implementation, but they have also done deliberation experiments, on a
large scale by Fishkin’s deliberative polling, 25 and on a smaller scale in
communities in Colorado and Connecticut. If I am right about some of my
criticisms of the larger-scale program, this will give us reason to look more
carefully at the smaller, more incremental instantiations of Deliberation
Day. It is hard to imagine small steps to a fourth branch of government. 26
Both because of its boldness and its potential for immediate realizability,
Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal seems the best one to analyze. Its
boldness will make its errors (should there be any) easier to spot, and its
immediate realizability makes it the one that we should give closest
scrutiny because, on a smaller scale, it is already being used. 27
What, then, is the proposal? Ackerman and Fishkin propose that we set
aside a national holiday, before elections (first for presidential elections,
and then later on, for congressional elections as well), for citizens to debate
the issues of the campaign. 28 The process of preparing for Deliberation
Day begins one month before the actual date, by asking the candidates to
identify one or two “important issues” confronting the nation. 29 “Within a
two-party framework,” Ackerman and Fishkin write, “this query will
generate two to four themes that will structure the conversational run-up to
Deliberation Day,” which is held about two weeks before elections. 30 On
Deliberation Day itself, the two (in this case, presidential) candidates will
debate, and citizens will gather in groups throughout the nation to watch
24

Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 13-14.
FISHKIN, supra note 15.
26
To be fair, there have been smaller “citizen” panels that Leib relies on for examples of his
proposal on a smaller scale. But it still seems a large leap to an entirely new branch of government. On
Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal, we can see more realistically how small examples of deliberation
might grow into a full-scale Deliberation Day.
27
A compressed version of their proposal can be found in Bruce Ackerman & James Fishkin,
Deliberation Day, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2002).
28
DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 17.
29
Id. at 24.
30
Id.
25
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the debate. After the debate is finished, the groups that have met to watch
the debate will break up into still smaller groups (of fifteen or so). The
(smaller) groups of fifteen will debate among themselves for forty-five
minutes and choose questions to ask the representatives of the campaigns
in their larger group “citizen assembly.” In the citizen assembly itself, a
moderator will ask “local party representatives” 31 questions selected from
the list of questions prepared by the smaller groups. After lunch, the
citizens again meet with their small groups and make a list of supplemental
questions, which are then asked of party representatives at a second citizen
assembly. 32 The citizens meet in small groups a last time, and Deliberation
Day is over. 33 Two weeks later, they vote in the presidential election.
Ackerman and Fishkin acknowledge the demands such an arrangement
would place on party organization. As is clear from the description of
Deliberation Day, much depends on the citizen assembly—where local
party officials answer questions from the gathered small groups. Indeed,
Ackerman and Fishkin tout the revitalization of local party organization as
one of the benefits of Deliberation Day. “For the first time in a long time,”
they write, “it will no longer make sense for presidential campaigns to
operate independently of local party organizations.” 34 “How else,” they
continue, “will they be able to find tens of thousands of respected local
leaders to represent the national candidate at the citizen assemblies?” 35 But
such a demand for personnel will only be able to be met by the wellestablished political parties, i.e., Republicans and Democrats. It would be
impossible for third parties—even third parties with some national
following—to be able to compete with the major parties in providing
people to represent them on Deliberation Day. The lack of a representative
will be obvious: the two parties will have their representatives, fielding and
answering questions, while the third-party candidate will have no one to
defend him or her (even if the candidate does well in the debate), simply
because they lack the organizational resources to have a representative at
every Deliberation Day event. Ackerman and Fishkin mention, in a
footnote, that should a third-party candidate be “winning the support of 15
percent or more of the votes in leading opinion polls” then he or she would
be eligible for Deliberation Day (twenty percent for congressional races). 36
31

Id. at 30.
Id. at 34.
Id.
34
Id. at 32.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 105, 236 n.11. It is ironic that Ackerman and Fishkin rely on polls here.
32
33
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But this restriction seems almost an afterthought, insensitive to the
organizational demands Deliberation Day would put on any but the two
major parties. Even were a third-party candidate able to poll well in the run
up to Election Day, this still would not make up for the lack of
organizational and managerial support.
Why do the difficulties that third parties might face in Deliberation Day
matter? They matter because they affect the quality and the diversity of
deliberation on Deliberation Day by further entrenching the publicity
advantage of the two major parties. If no one shows up to represent the
third-party candidate at Deliberation Day (supposing that the third-party
candidate wins the required fifteen percent in public opinion polls), it will
not only make the third party look bad (because no one will be there to
defend the candidate’s position on issues or to articulate them further in
response to questions) but the citizens in the citizen assembly will miss out
on the opinions and the facts that the third-party candidate representative
could bring to the table. Debate will be poorer because it will not represent
the full range of opinion. Although the questions asked to representatives
of the two major parties might be influenced by the presence of the thirdparty candidate in the televised debate (again, if that candidate had 15
percent support in the polls), the fact that the major party representatives
would be the only ones there to debate and answer the questions will affect
how that question is treated. Imagine how the moderator will have to
announce to the citizen assembly, “Regrettably, there is no one here to
defend the (Green, Conservative, etc.) party, so you will only be able to
ask questions of the Democrat and Republican representatives.” Alexander
Meiklejohn famously stated the ideal of democratic debate was a debate in
which everything that was worth saying was said. 37 In the world of
Ackerman and Fishkin’s Deliberation Day, only that which has sufficient
institutional support gets said.
The point here is a structural one: the structure of Deliberation Day
focuses debate in a certain way, maintains the two-party system, and
prevents serious challenges to it. Deliberation Day does not merely
presuppose the two-party system but it entrenches that system by giving
the two major parties significant advantages: first, by restricting the
televised debate to only those candidates who can get fifteen percent
approval in the polls 38 and second, by erecting a practical barrier against
37

ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 26 (Oxford Univ. Press 1965) (1948).
38
The problem of limiting televised debates to only candidates who had a certain amount of
support in the polls was explored in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S.
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representation in the citizen assemblies. In doing this, Ackerman and
Fishkin, with or without realizing it, are siding with the Supreme Court’s
decisions in this area, which have in many ways helped foster the
continued entrenchment of the major parties. In Richard Pildes’ telling, the
bias in the Supreme Court’s election law jurisprudence has been towards
protecting major parties, and their distinctiveness. 39 This two-party
entrenchment has been visible in many ways, from the Court preventing
parties from opening their primaries to independent voters, to keeping third
parties off the ballot and making it harder for them to participate in
televised debates. 40 From the Supreme Court’s perspective, according to
Pildes and others, the goal is for stable elections, in the sense of avoiding
the potential “disorder” and “confusion” of multiparty and multi-candidate
elections. 41 These decisions show the way that, in Pildes’ words,
“constitutional law now limits the structural changes through which
disaffection with the current practices of democratic politics can be given
institutional expression.” 42 The current system already entrenches the two
parties directly, by allowing them to set the conditions that make it harder
for third parties to compete in politics. 43 It also benefits the two parties
indirectly, by giving incumbents advantages in their races and allowing

666 (1998), with the Court giving great leeway to a public television station to choose whom it wanted
to invite to the debates.
39
Pildes, supra note 10.
40
See Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 593-94 (2005) (upholding Oklahoma’s semiclosed
primary law, and claiming that states have an interest in preserving the identity of the major parties);
Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998) (allowing limits on third-party access to
televised debates); Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party¸ 520 U.S. 351, 353-54, 367 (1997)
(upholding restrictions on “fusion” candidates, and noting that states can enact election regulations that
“in practice, favor the traditional two-party system”); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189,
194-96 (1986) (upholding primary qualification requirements for third party candidates to appear on the
general election ballot); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30, 736 (1974) (upholding restrictions on
independent candidates for office, and affirming that states can take measures to prevent “unrestrained
factionalism”); Pildes, supra note 9, at 168-72. See also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438-39
(1992) (upholding Hawaii’s ban on write-in candidates in its general election, in the interest of
preventing factionalism). See generally Jessica C. Furst, Case Comment, Election Law: “Three’s a
Crowd”: Supreme Court Protection for the Two-Party System, 58 FLA. L. REV. 921 (2006); Richard L.
Hasen, Entrenching the Duopoly: Why the Supreme Court Should Not Allow the States to Protect the
Democrats and Republicans from Political Competition, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Bradley A. Smith,
Note, Judicial Protection of Ballot-Access Rights: Third Parties Need Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 167, 172-73 (1991).
41
Pildes, supra note 10, at 158.
42
Pildes, supra note 9, at 155.
43
See also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 7, at 348 (describing the major political parties as
“gatekeepers”). See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major Political Parties: A
Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741 (1993) (noting the role that the major parties have in
structuring access to government).
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Democrats and Republicans to draw districts that divide political power
between them. 44
It is not clear, as I have intimated, that Ackerman and Fishkin would
want to embrace this trend. It is even less clear that they should want to
embrace it. Again, if the goal is deliberation, this goal might not be
furthered by excluding third parties from the debate, and allowing the two
parties to have the entire field to themselves. Although such exclusion is
not always the case with televised debates, it is almost certainly true in
most citizen assemblies, where third parties will not have the infrastructure
to support “opinion leaders for their team on Deliberation Day.” 45 But the
point goes deeper than this: if the structure of Deliberation Day does not
work against the entrenchment of the two parties (and the subsequent
limiting of debate) then it unwittingly furthers that entrenchment. What
Ackerman and Fishkin see as revitalizing local party politics is, viewed
from another angle, simply exploiting the disadvantages third parties have
in entering the political process. 46 Nor can the Ackerman and Fishkin
proposal be seen as dictated by necessity, say, by avoiding too many
candidates. Certainly Deliberation Day could bear three or even four
presidential candidates, which suggests that the poll number for entry
could be set lower (or made by other criteria, for example if the candidates
had polled at a certain percentage in the previous presidential election).
Further, even if third parties were not invited to the debate, they could
participate in other ways, say, by being allowed to put one issue in front of
the major party candidates—an area which Ackerman and Fishkin place
wholly under the discretion of the two major party candidates. Finally,
more citizen assemblies could be televised to reduce the strain of having to
supply one party member for each assembly. Again, the point is not that
these proposals are obviously correct, but that they can be made. This
shows that Ackerman and Fishkin made choices about how to structure
deliberation, and that structure works to the detriment of allowing certain
voices into the debate, hurting not only the excluded parties, but also the
possibility of robust deliberation itself. In doing so, Ackerman and Fishkin
violate a condition on successful deliberation that they themselves
introduce: the Meiklejohnian idea of “normative completeness”—that for

44

See Pildes, supra note 8, at 59-60 (discussing legislative “self-entrenchment”).
Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 32.
46
For a good overview of different theories about the role of parties in a democracy, see Nathaniel
Persily & Bruce E. Cain, The Legal Status of Political Parties: A Reassessment of Competing
Paradigms, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 775 (2000).
45
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full and robust debate there must be “confrontation with a series of
different views.” 47
Ackerman and Fishkin may be doing the best that they can to deepen
deliberation within the two-party system, rather than to find ways in which
to accommodate other parties. This is a defensible position, but it needs
defending. A proper defense would require an ideal of deliberation that
puts a premium on having two political parties debate, rather than having
three or four candidates share the stage. It is not obvious that two
candidates are better than three or four, especially if the tendency for the
two major parties is to move ineluctably towards the center. Deliberation
over an increasingly narrow set of differences does not seem to exhaust the
possibilities of robust deliberation. Indeed, Ackerman and Fishkin may
share this view: they speak (wistfully?) of a Green party candidate making
a run in the year 2020. 48 But the point of the preceding argument is that the
structure of Deliberation Day gives the major parties an advantage and
may even preclude any third-party candidate from gaining momentum. It is
no good to hope for a possibility that their very proposal makes harder to
obtain.
III. GERRYMANDERED DISTRICTS
In the previous part of this essay, I looked at how Ackerman and
Fishkin’s proposal arguably limited debate, rather than expanded it, by
instituting a deliberative structure that in effect (if not by intention)
excluded third parties from deliberation. The focus there was on what was
the topic of deliberation. Would it be the proposals and ideas of the two
major parties, which already enjoy a huge institutional advantage? Or
would it be the concerns of third parties, who are often excluded from the
ballot in some races? In other words, the question was: who decides what
concerns get on the table? My thesis was that by making certain choices,
Ackerman and Fishkin did not fight two-party entrenchment, but rather
increased it. There is another way that debate can be limited, however: not
by restricting what options get on the table (whether it will be the issues of
the two major parties or of third parties), but by the selection of who
among the citizens (rather than the candidates) will participate in the
debate. There are many ways that we could approach this issue with
relation to Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal. Here we might reference a
47
48

Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 182.
Id. at 261 n.25.

158

Journal of Law and Politics

[Vol.XXIII:147

commonplace (but nonetheless valid) objection to deliberative democracy:
the theory that it favors those who are well educated and articulate as
opposed to those who lack effective speaking skills and may be less
inclined to voice their concerns on Deliberation Day as a result. 49
We might also note the evident class bias in a sentence such as this one,
when Ackerman and Fishkin consider what might be the cost of using
schools as spaces for Deliberation Day activity: “The answer is
straightforward once you recall that the schools are already closed on
Presidents Day while kids join their parents for ski weekends and holiday
sales.” 50 The possibility that some school-age children and their parents
might have jobs and need to work on Presidents Day does not seem to
enter Ackerman and Fishkin’s ken. Nor, one might suspect, do they take
seriously how employees in fields with little autonomy might feel about
using their time off to deliberate rather than staying on the job, and
possibly earning overtime pay. 51
There may be ways in which Deliberation Day “selects out” certain
people from the class of deliberators. It may do this, even though everyone
shows up by giving an implicit preference to those who are more articulate.
It also may do this by discouraging some people from showing up in the
first place by not effectively countering the (legitimate) incentives some
may have to stay away from Deliberation Day. But these are not the
problems I want to focus on, although it is clear that they deserve more
detailed treatment. 52 Moreover, it is not clear that these kinds of problems
affect Deliberation Day uniquely, as opposed to any effort at encouraging
deliberation. Further, they do not touch on the present concern of this
paper, which is to show how the structure of election law may make a
difference to how citizens deliberate on Deliberation Day, as opposed to
how social or other facts may influence deliberation. This is a more general
concern.
To turn to the concern of this Part: How might the structure of
American elections dictate who participates in Deliberation Day? In order
to get at what I think is a problem in the Ackerman/Fishkin proposal, I first
49
Richard Posner makes some of these points in his review of Deliberation Day. Richard Posner,
Smooth Sailing, LEGAL. AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 41, 42 (book review) (“I sense a power grab by the
articulate class whose comparative advantage is—deliberation.”).
50
Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 136.
51
Ackerman and Fishkin mention the issue of adequate child care on Deliberation Day, but offer
no real proposal to deal with the (obvious) problem. Id. at 123, 129-30. Note also that even though
Deliberation Day is a national holiday, there may still be pressures on employees not to take off work.
52
See generally Iris Marion Young, Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, in DEBATING
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 102.
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need to describe the background to their extension of Deliberation Day
past presidential elections, into “Congress Day.” 53 For presidential
elections, the groupings of citizens in large assemblies can be done based
on convenience. Although Ackerman and Fishkin do not give much in the
way of detail on this point, we can assume that people will meet at places
that are near to them, or accessible via public transportation; they may
even join friends at some deliberation forum, even if it is not very close to
where they live. It does not matter, at least for presidential elections, that
people from various parts of a state (or even from out of the state) meet to
debate and discuss the positions of the two major-party presidential
candidates. But location becomes relevant when it comes to Congress Day.
Since citizens will be voting for their Congressperson to represent their
locality, they will be meeting and debating only with other people in their
state (in the case of Senators) or in their districts (in the case of
Congressman). Here, local boundaries matter, and we cannot accept the
fluid geographic boundaries that might be the norm in presidential
elections. In the end, one can only vote for a representative in one’s own
district. And geographical boundaries matter in a good way: they matter
because they dictate that certain matters of genuinely local concern will be
on the agenda, rather than a generic and broad national agenda.
Ackerman and Fishkin propose a Deliberation Day for congressional
elections, albeit on a smaller scale than the presidential Deliberation Day.
But Ackerman and Fishkin are also aware that there is a problem with
congressional races that does not affect the presidential race: in the
presidential races, barriers between districts don’t matter much: it won’t
make a difference whether you attend the Deliberation Day meeting in
your own district or the neighboring one, or perhaps even one in another
state. In the case of congressional races, state and local districts matter, and
because of partisan gerrymandering, some districts will involve races that
are simply not competitive. 54 Districts will lean heavily towards the
Democratic or Republican party, with the result that it may not pay for the
other party even to put up a candidate, or to give more than merely token
opposition to the candidate who benefits from the gerrymander. Ackerman
and Fishkin even go so far as to say that if there is no major-party
53

Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 97-119.
It has wryly been remarked that although people think that we have elections to choose
representatives, the reality is that through partisan redistricting, representatives choose the people who
will elect them. For an overview of the current election law debate on partisan gerrymanders, see
Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political
Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2004).
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challenger in a race, “the celebration should be canceled if polls show that
third-party candidates have failed to gain the support of 20 percent of
likely voters.” 55 Even when they are attentive to a structural problem that
can affect the outcome of elections (partisan gerrymanders), Ackerman and
Fishkin fail again to give possible third-party candidates any breaks. This
treatment ignores how third-party candidates may benefit in a
disproportionate way by being part of a Deliberation Day—it may give
them the publicity they need to be taken seriously. If a major party fields a
candidate, however token, Deliberation Day takes place. If a third-party
candidate polls fifteen percent, and is the only opponent against a major
party candidate, Deliberation Day is cancelled. 56
Suppose, however, that there is a race between congressional candidates
of the two major parties, in a district that has been gerrymandered along
political lines (in other words, where one candidate enjoys a huge
advantage because the district has been designed to hold candidates from
his or her own party). 57 Now there may be a problem not only with who
the citizens are exposed to, both in their small groups and in the citizen
assemblies, but also with the composition of the assemblies themselves. A
gerrymandered district means that most of the people attending
Deliberation Day will be of the same party and more generally of the same
ideological disposition. The result is what Cass Sunstein has famously
called “group polarization.” 58 By being exposed to people who share
opinions and who know facts that support one side of the debate (and who
do not know the facts that may support the other side), groups that
deliberate together, Sunstein suggests, will tend toward the extremes of
their positions. 59 Right-wing groups that deliberate together will become
more right-wing; and the same will happen with left-wing groups. The
structure of elections on the congressional level creates the circumstances
55

Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 105.
In some states, this also may make a difference in whether third parties get on the ballot in
subsequent elections. See, e.g., Green Party of Alaska v. State Div. of Elections, 147 P.3d 728, 728
(Alaska 2006) (upholding an Alaska statute which “required a group to attain at least three percent of
the votes polled in the last gubernatorial election, or to register the equivalent number of voters”).
57
Note that there will be districts that are “packed” with all members of the party either because
the majority party wants to have a safe margin of victory in that district, or because they are trying to
put all of the other party’s voters in a single district (to reduce the other party’s chances of winning
other districts).
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See Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, in DEBATING DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY, supra note 2, at 80 [hereinafter Sunstein, Group Polarization]; Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go To Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble].
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Sunstein, Group Polarization, supra note 58, at 80; Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note
58, at 71.
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for deliberation not to be open, but to have it tend towards ever more closemindedness and strident opinions. Sunstein and some of his co-authors
have confirmed this hypothesis in experiments designed to mimic initially
polarized debating. 60 True to the hypothesis, deliberators who were already
leaning in a similar way (as citizens in partisan districts are) became more
extreme in their original positions. 61
Ackerman and Fishkin address Sunstein’s worry about the pathologies
of deliberation, i.e., how polarization can make deliberation a vehicle for
“groupthink and issue polarization.” 62 But their responses to Sunstein are
flawed in a number of respects. First, they refer only to Sunstein’s early
studies on polarization among jurors. 63 Ackerman and Fishkin are right to
notice that the contexts of jury deliberation and Deliberation Day are
different, but Sunstein has since replicated his findings in contexts that
more resemble what Deliberation Day would look like. 64 Second, and more
importantly, they respond to Sunstein only in the case of presidential
Deliberation Day, and not on congressional Deliberation Day. But for
reasons I explored above, geographical boundaries are much more salient
when it comes to congressional races, and the conditions in some
congressional races will exactly mimic those conditions in which Sunstein
finds an increasing polarization of voters. Third, even if deliberators on
Deliberation Day do not have to reach a conclusion or take a side on an
issue, polarization may still affect what issues get discussed in the first
place and what sorts of things candidates should care about. This will
create pressure towards polarization, even if it is not convergence on a
single answer or position. Finally, Ackerman and Fishkin say that issue
polarization and groupthink will be minimized when deliberators shift
from their small groups to the large assembly and back again. But this
would be true more of the presidential debates, where we can expect
people from a variety of geographical backgrounds and who will not have
been pre-selected for their ideological leanings. This is not the case, as we
have seen, when we consider partisan districts. And indeed, the shift from
60
Sunstein, Group Polarization, supra note 58, at 80; Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, supra note
58, at 71.
61
David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What Happened on Deliberation Day? (June
21, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=91
1646). See also Josh Chafetz, Book Note, It's the Aggregation, Stupid! 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV
577, 583 n. 36 (2005) (book review) (citing the risk of polarization in the real-world context of
deliberation day).
62
Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 61-65.
63
Id. at 63-65.
64
See Schakade, Sunstein & Hastie, supra note 61, at 2.
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large groups (where the minority party candidate will at least have a voice)
back to small groups (where it is only citizens who will be primarily from
the majority party, by hypothesis) may work to counteract dissent, by
snuffing it out when the citizens return to their small groups.
To be fair, Ackerman and Fishkin are aware of the problem of partisan
gerrymandering, and they recommend, in an aside, “relying on a
nonpartisan commission to draw district lines.” 65 This, however, is in
reference to the problem that many races will be non-competitive, and
Deliberation Day may have to be canceled when there is no major party
candidate and the third-party candidate does not poll more than twenty
percent. My claim as articulated above is that there is a problem in a
gerrymandered district, and not simply because of lack of competition.
This is a problem with the candidates. There may also be a problem,
though, with the composition of the group of citizens who deliberate, even
when there are two major party candidates running. The point once more is
a structural one. If we are to have robust deliberation, the composition of
the group deliberating ideally should include some diversity of opinion.
Unfortunately, the structure of American law gives us good reason, in the
context of congressional races at least, to think that the conditions for
robust deliberation will not be present. 66 Indeed, deliberation might even
be counterproductive: resulting in people to shift to even more extreme
positions, based on the limited information and the group pressures they
confront on Deliberation Day. It suggests, indeed, that Ackerman and
Fishkin’s optimism about the effects of deliberation is misguided.
Ackerman and Fishkin write that, “if Deliberation Day succeeded,
everything else would change: the candidates, the media, the activists, the
interests groups . . . .” 67 However, if deliberation occurs in a context where
citizens become more extreme—such as in a successfully gerrymandered
district—everything would not change, and polarization could become
worse. All of this suggests that if we do not attend to structural problems
first and work from the top down, rather than expect deliberation to effect
changes from the bottom up, deliberation will simply not have the benefits

65
66
67

Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 105.
Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 54, at 541.
Ackerman & Fishkin, DELIBERATION DAY, supra note 15, at 3.
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Ackerman and Fishkin promise. 68 In other words, there will be a trade-off
between immediate deliberation and better deliberation. 69
IV. RACE AND REPRESENTATION
In the previous two sections, I asked whether the structure of election
law might not work against better deliberation, rather than for it. In Part I, I
decided that the proposal by Ackerman and Fishkin might further entrench
the two parties, by giving an advantage to them because of their preexisting institutional advantages. The result would be that already
struggling third parties would be locked out of Deliberation Day. In Part II,
I suggested that the pattern of districting in America meant that
deliberation among citizens in gerrymandered districts might lead to what
Cass Sunstein has called “group polarization.” Ackerman and Fishkin,
admittedly, do recognize the problem of partisan gerrymandering in the
abstract, and make recommendations about what to do about it. But the
point is one of priority. Should we have citizens start deliberating, or
should we first look at the structures of American election law that might
limit deliberation, or cause the deliberation to be less than ideal?
In this Part, I take up a concern which is in a way orthogonal to the
discussion of the previous two sections. In those sections, I took for
granted that having better citizen deliberation was desirable. The question
was only whether Ackerman and Fishkin’s proposal seemed likely to make
deliberation better, given the structure of election law, or to make it worse?
Now I consider a different question: is more citizen deliberation always
better? What do I mean by this question? I mean in the first instance that
there may be some goals that we would want to promote that more
deliberation would hinder. In this case, we would not want to maximize
citizen deliberation, but to restrict it. Indeed, as I go on to suggest in this
Part, there may be a trade-off in terms of levels of deliberation. 70 Limiting
deliberation at one level may lead to the election of a representative who at
another level (at the level of legislative debate, say) might make for better
68
The Supreme Court has so far avoided deciding that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.
For a comprehensive statement of the Court’s refusal to intervene, see the majority opinion (authored
by Justice Scalia) in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
69
Why would we favor immediate, poorer deliberation over later, better deliberation? Perhaps we
felt that deliberation (even bad deliberation) had a legitimating function, as opposed to merely being a
device to produce better decisions. This would make no deliberation worse than even polarized
deliberation.
70
In Parts I and II, by contrast, the question was about trade-offs between kinds of deliberation.
These included whether deliberation ought to be two-party or multiparty, as well as whether or not it
ought to be polarized.
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deliberation. Again, in thinking about this problem, I take my example
from the structure of American election law; in this case, it involves the
question of ensuring minority representation. Here, I want to propose that
we do not merely have a potential question about whether deliberation as a
value should trump other values, but a question about whether deliberation
at another, higher level, should be preferred over better citizen
deliberation.
At least since the Voting Rights Act was passed in 1964, Congress has
passed measures designed to elect more minority representatives, primarily
by encouraging the drawing districts that are majority minority, otherwise
referred to as “safe” minority districts. 71 At one angle, this is simply a
matter of rectifying a past wrong: districts had been historically drawn to
deprive blacks of the ability to elect a candidate of their choice. 72 On this
understanding of the need for majority minority districts, the point of
drawing districts favorable to black candidates would in principle become
otiose once it was felt that the past wrong was completely, or nearly
completely, rectified. But we might consider another justification for raceconscious districting apart from the desire to right past wrongs, and give
blacks an electoral voice where they have previously been deprived of one.
We might think that having a diversity of voices at the legislative level is a
good thing in itself, and so electing minority candidates would be good for
this reason. This justification of race-conscious districting can be found in
a recent Supreme Court affirmative action case, for instance. 73 In that case,
the Court asserts that it is better that students be exposed to diverse
viewpoints and positions. This goal, the Court states, can be served in part
by instituting affirmative action policies. We can imagine a similar claim
on the level of race-conscious districting. What is more, it is not too hard to
see this argument being made in terms of increasing the quality of diversity
at the legislative level: the more diverse the debating body, the better the
quality of debate.
Bracket, for the moment, the precise merits of this argument for
majority minority, or “safe” districts; one does not have to be persuaded of
it to see that it might have some claim to our assent, and more importantly,
to how we think about elections. What we should notice at this point is that
should we agree to increasing the quality of deliberation at the legislative
71
For a controversial history of the Voting Rights Act and its aftermath, see ABIGAIL
THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? (1987).
72
See id. at 11-30.
73
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that diversity might be considered as
essential to a university’s educational mission).

2007]

Deliberative Dilemmas

165

level (and if we think increasing minority representation would contribute
to this goal), then we might have to achieve this through limiting debate at
the citizen level, or at least potentially diminishing its quality. Better
deliberation on one level may mean worse deliberation on another level.
But now what we have is a tension between levels of deliberation: what
might lead to better deliberation at one level (the representative level)
might only be achieved by making deliberation worse at another level (the
level of citizens). Importantly, the trade-off is not between deliberation
and some other value (national security) but about a tension between two
levels at which deliberation should occur. What level should we prefer?
To make this problem more concrete, consider the Supreme Court’s
pivotal decision on race districting, Georgia v. Ashcroft. 74 At issue in that
case was Georgia’s compliance with the Voting Rights Act, which as
interpreted by the Court, required that certain “covered” (i.e., covered by
the Voting Rights Act) states not “retrogress” when it came to minority
representation, through proposals to change the districting plan of a state.
The issue, in the case, was what retrogression really meant. Did it mean
that the number of minority representatives in Georgia had to stay the same
under the new districting plan? Or could a new districting plan allow for
minority representation in other ways, such as through the creation of
districts where black voters might have the potential to shift an electoral
outcome, rather than control it (so-called “influence” districts)? The
decision of the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, ruled that Georgia’s plan, although it did not necessarily keep
the same number of districts that were certain to elect black candidates,
was permissible. 75 Why? It was a legitimate move, she said, if a state
wanted to try a districting plan that would try to preserve minority
representation by creating “coalition” or “influence” districts, as opposed
to maintaining districts which guaranteed that black candidates were
elected. 76 Citing Hannah Pitkin, Justice O’Connor argued that “descriptive
representation” was not the only kind of representation we should try to
secure; we should also treat favorably plans that would help “substantive
representation” as well. 77 The strategy evinced by the Georgia plan,
O’Connor wrote, “has the potential to increase ‘substantive representation’
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in more districts by creating coalitions of voters who will together help to
achieve the electoral aspirations of the minority group.” 78
Note the language of Justice O’Connor’s opinion: one point she makes
in favor of the Georgia plan is that enables coalitions of voters to work
together to endorse a shared candidate. From this language, we might be
able to see her opinion as one which Ackerman and Fishkin would approve
of. By creating “influence” districts where black voters may influence the
vote but not determine it, citizens will be forced to deliberate with one
another and to create coalitions across racial lines in order to elect a
candidate that will represent both of their sets of interests. 79 Citizen
deliberation, on this plan, we can surmise, would be increased. But the
tradeoff to this is that a candidate might be elected who does not
adequately represent minority interests. The result of having to bargain and
deliberate with other citizens may mean that the minority preferred
candidate might lose (as O’Connor acknowledges 80 ). This might mean that
minority interests are not fully represented at the congressional level. It
might also meant that deliberation at the congressional level might well be
poorer: a candidate who represents a coalition of interests may have less of
a defined viewpoint than a candidate who is elected from a majority
minority district, and who has the freedom, perhaps, to take positions that
would not otherwise be represented in Congress.
So here we have a potential tradeoff within the value of deliberation, as
opposed to trade-offs in the kind or quality of deliberation. Which level of
deliberation should we prefer? Should we limit some citizen deliberation—
such as the coalition building that might result from the creation of
influence districts—in order to make possible better and more diverse
deliberation at another level? To be sure, much of the above argument
depends on premises that are controversial, e.g., that coalitions could not
recognize that minority candidates might be a good thing, and that
representatives from safe minority districts will necessarily bring a diverse
viewpoint from Congress. But the point is larger than the particular
example. The point is the structural one about levels of deliberation, which
we have to consider so long as we are not merely talking about direct
democracy, but about representative democracy. 81 Once we have another
78
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level, we inevitably have to consider the relationship between the two
levels, and this problem will emerge in many different contexts. Indeed, we
might have even considered the question in terms of partisan
gerrymandered districts. Is it better to have voters become more extreme,
so that those candidates with more extreme viewpoints will be elected to
Congress? I did not consider this issue in the context of partisan
gerrymandered districts, because I assumed (perhaps mistakenly) that an
excess of partisanship in representative deliberations might be a vice,
where with minority districts, it is an open question whether we might
want to increase the number of blacks and Latinos in Congress, not merely
for the sake of remedying past exclusion, but for the sake of deliberation
that takes the interests of many different sorts of constituents into account.
V. CONCLUSION
In closing, I want to put my criticisms of Ackerman and Fishkin’s
proposal in some context, to make clear the aim of those criticisms, and
their limits. I have four points to make. First, my criticisms are surely not
made in the spirit of undermining the whole idea of Deliberation Day.
Indeed, I think something like Deliberation Day is very promising and my
criticisms could be read in a way to suggest emendations to Ackerman and
Fishkin’s idea. For example, I suggested that third parties might be able to
supply some of the issues that the deliberators on Deliberation Day
undertake to discuss, even if the third-party candidate does not poll the
required fifteen percent. More deeply, I wondered whether third-party
candidates might be invited to the debate, even if they have not reached
fifteen percent in the polls. This might serve the interests of deliberation by
exposing the deliberators to more points of view, 82 and thus is a reform
made in the spirit of improving the deliberation that occurs during
Deliberation Day. It is not a suggestion that we should do away with
Deliberation Day, or that Deliberation Day is an inherently flawed idea.
With partisan gerrymandering, Ackerman and Fishkin agree that this
problem needs to be addressed; my only emendation to their proposal was
that failure to address this problem first might result in deliberation being
less productive and more skewed than it otherwise might be. Far from a
deep disagreement between Ackerman and Fishkin and myself, this is a
comparatively minor squabble about priorities. As for the problem of race
82
In fact, I would favor inviting the third-party candidate to the debate, even if the other parts of
Deliberation Day were kept the same.
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and elections, this is a deep one, and it is no fault of Deliberation Day that
it does not solve it. Perhaps one simply has to make a choice between
robust citizen deliberation and diversity of representation. Or perhaps one
could find a solution that would be able to reconcile these two levels of
deliberation. All of this is to say that none of the three major points above
are addressed globally, at the very idea of a Deliberation Day. These points
instead are meant to show that if Deliberation Day does not recognize and
address the structure of American election law, its aims and its purposes
might be frustrated. And this is an argument that is done in the spirit of
those aims and purposes.
Ackerman and Fishkin may disagree with the direction these proposals
could take us. This takes me to the second point I want to emphasize.
Ackerman and Fishkin may feel that it is better to have deep and robust
two party debates, because offering voters two clearly defined choices is
better than having a cacophony of many voices in a discussion. They might
prefer even polarized discussion on Congress Day to no debate at all. And
they might reject the idea that it is better to limit citizen debate in order to
have more diverse debate at the level of representatives. All of these
options are perfectly defensible. The problem is that Ackerman and
Fishkin fail to give them the defense that they need. When Ackerman and
Fishkin make a proposal that opts for one of these conceptions of debate,
they are pushing other options off the table. In the words of my title: they
are opting for one horn of several dilemmas that exist between kinds and
levels of deliberation. In the same way, the present structure of American
election law makes trade-offs, by entrenching two party candidates, by
allowing partisan gerrymanders, and constructing minority “safe” districts.
This system is again defensible, but it needs a defense, in terms of the two
party system, in terms of the good of diverse debate, etc. I have intimated
throughout this paper that perhaps a defense of the system can be made in
terms of a certain ideal of deliberation.83 But, as I have also stressed, that
ideal of deliberation is not the only one out there.
My third clarification may already be implicit in what I have said, but it
is important to bring out. Recently, there have been many critics of the
good of deliberation itself. 84 It is hopelessly misguided, it is argued, to
think that deliberation between citizens can ever really be productive. For
83
At least, this is the suggestion. Perhaps American election law should not be directed towards
any one ideal, but rather it may instantiate a number of conflicting ideals: free expression, equality,
association, etc.
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But Sunstein offers his criticisms in a spirit friendly to deliberation.

2007]

Deliberative Dilemmas

169

example, in a recent book, Guido Pincione and Fernando Tesón argue that
“political deliberation does not serve cognitive goals, and it often drives us
further from the truth.” 85 I do not share the pessimism of these authors. Or
rather, I do not share their pessimism about the possibilities of democratic
deliberation. Ackerman and Fishkin make a powerful case that our current
state of deliberation is very poor; but this does not mean that it cannot
change. The problem, Ackerman and Fishkin claim, is one of how politics
is currently organized, and not about the intrinsic possibilities or
limitations of deliberative rationality. Politics is not currently organized
around rational persuasion, but rather around sound bites. By proposing
Deliberation Day, Ackerman and Fishkin aim to make giving arguments
the center of campaigns: it puts a premium on articulating positions that
will stand the test of questioning and discussion. Again, my argument in
this paper can be seen in the service of this larger project. My claim has
been that if we do not recognize certain existing structural impediments to
better deliberation, or trade-offs we might be forced to make between kinds
of deliberation, we might end up increasing rather than reducing certain
pathologies of deliberation. The barriers to effective deliberation are deep,
a fact no one need deny. The appeal of Ackerman and Fishkin’s project is
that it recognizes the extent we may have to go to remove those barriers.
My essay has merely pointed to a few additional barriers we will need to
overcome.
But how to overcome those barriers? Here I reach my final point of
clarification, and it may represent a real point of difference between my
approach and the approach that Ackerman and Fishkin take. As I have
stated repeatedly throughout my paper, Ackerman and Fishkin have a faith
that if we unleash citizen deliberation, then reform will emerge, from the
bottom up. They say, as I have quoted them, “If Deliberation Day
succeeded, everything else would change: the candidates, the media, the
activists, the interests groups, the spin doctors . . . .” 86 The idea is not
outlandish, even if it is a little optimistic. If there were a Deliberation Day,
many incentives would change. But it is wrong to think that citizen
deliberation, by itself, can make these changes. Indeed, if the electoral
structures I have pointed to are not changed first, then deliberation may
well be counterproductive. It will not be as wide-ranging as we might have
hoped, with the result that the two major parities become more entrenched,
85
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and debate as result will become more impoverished (at best) or polarized
(at worst). So in many cases we will have to start from the top down. And
this is where I return to my major theme, which is that deliberative
democratic theory will need to pay attention to election law if its proposals
are to be realistic and effective. For it is precisely election law and at the
limit the Constitution that dictates the larger electoral structure that I have
been describing. As the Supreme Court conducts further
“constitutionalization of democratic politics,” 87 the structure of election
law increasingly becomes inscribed into the structure of the Constitution
itself. Is the Constitution silent about partisan gerrymanders? About the
rights of third parties? Insofar as more deliberation will make a difference
here, it will not be the deliberation of ordinary citizens in assemblies first
and foremost, but the deliberations a different body, arguably more august
but still potentially partisan—the Supreme Court.
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Pildes, supra note 8, at 154.

